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Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, and Your Country 
Shoppers: Reevaluating the Firm Resettlement 
Requirement in U.S. Asylum Law after Maharaj v. 
Gonzales 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States has always been a place of refuge for people 
fleeing persecution or seeking protection. As Lady Liberty raises her 
torch to the world, the words inscribed on the statue ring out as an 
explicit invitation to the “huddled masses,” “wretched refuse,” 
“homeless,” and “tempest-tossed” of other nations.1 Each year the United 
States provides homes to tens of thousands who fear or face persecution, 
accepting a higher number of refugees than all other countries 
combined.2 A refugee is someone who cannot stay in, or return to, their 
original country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion[.]”3  Those living outside the 
 1. EMMA LAZARUS, THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. I. 
NARRATIVE, LYRIC, AND DRAMATIC 202–03 (Cambridge, The Riverside Press 1889), available at 
http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=amverse;cc=amverse;rgn=div2;view=text;idno= 
BAL7876.0001.001;node=BAL7876.0001.001%3A34.3. 
 
THE NEW COLOSSUS. 
NOT like the brazen giant of Greek fame, 
With conquering limbs astride from land to land; 
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand 
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame 
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name 
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand 
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command 
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame. 
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she 
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 
 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERV., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006: REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 2, 54 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52475.pdf. 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). 
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United States may apply for “refugee” status while those in the United 
States or at a port of entry may apply for “asylum.”4
Even so, a limited number of spots are granted to refugees and 
asylees each year. This number is set by the U.S. President, who consults 
with Congress, and may be modified in cases of emergency. In 2005, the 
admissions ceiling for refugees was set at seventy thousand persons.5
According to U.S. immigration law, an alien may not obtain asylum 
in the United States if that person was firmly resettled in a third country 
before entering the United States.6 Thus, courts are faced with the task of 
determining whether or not a person was “firmly resettled,” and the 
outcome has not always been consistent.7 Some courts find resettlement 
only where there has been a direct offer of permanent residency, while 
other courts are willing to consider the totality of circumstances—family 
ties, legal rights, and intent to stay—in determining whether resettlement 
has occurred. 
A recent Ninth Circuit trend makes it easier for asylum seekers to 
gain legal status in the United States and encourages country 
shopping8—an activity adverse to asylum’s purpose and one that may 
create an undue burden on the U.S. economy. To be true to the statutory 
text and still honor the purpose of asylum, courts should return to the 
totality of circumstances standard for determining resettlement but give 
first priority and most weight to the existence of an offer. 
Section II of this Note will briefly describe the history of the 
resettlement doctrine and outline the conflict between circuit courts. 
Section III presents the case of Maharaj v. Gonzales,9 in which a family 
sought asylum in the United States after spending four years in Canada. 
Using this 2006 Ninth Circuit case as a backdrop, section IV evaluates 
current interpretations of the firm resettlement requirement and its 
implication for future cases. The conclusion section summarizes the main 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLOW 
REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES, 2005 1 (May 2006) [hereinafter ANNUAL FLOW REPORT]. 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. Debbie M. Schell, Annotation, When Has Alien Firmly Resettled in Another Country so 
as to Mitigate Against or Preclude Grant of Asylum in the United States, 189 A.L.R. Fed. 231, at 
231 (2003). 
 7. See, e.g., Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006) (using totality of circumstances 
approach and finding insufficient evidence of firm resettlement); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687 
(7th Cir. 2004) (using formal offer approach and finding no firm resettlement in Senegal based 
solely on a lengthy stay); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that government 
documents approving asylum application—without a formal offer—were not sufficient evidence to 
establish firm resettlement); Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding firm resettlement 
based on alien’s plentiful opportunities and comfortable circumstances in Germany even when no 
offer of permanent residency existed). 
 8. See infra note 139. 
 9. 450 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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arguments and emphasizes the importance of a clear standard for 
determining firm resettlement. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History of the Firm Resettlement Doctrine 
 
The doctrine of firm resettlement has its roots in the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which established an 
international framework for protecting asylum seekers.10 In its definition 
of a refugee, the convention excludes any “person who is recognized by 
the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence 
as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession 
of nationality of that country”11 and any person who “has acquired a new 
nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new 
nationality[.]”12 Although the central purpose of the 1951 convention 
was to shield “persons deprived of the rights and protections that national 
citizenship ordinarily affords,” the above provisions indicate that persons 
who have the rights and protections that citizenship affords do not need 
protection in another country.13
The obligations outlined in the 1951 convention were formally 
implemented with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.14 This act 
codified asylum law and marked the first time that aliens who were 
physically present in the United States could legalize their presence by 
applying for asylum.15
 
1.  Pre-1990 application 
 
The first Supreme Court case to address firm resettlement was 
Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo.16 But before 1990, an alien’s resettlement 
in another country was only one factor to be considered in evaluating an 
asylum claim.17 Courts that did look at resettlement deemed it reasonable 
 10. See Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 47, 
49 (2004). 
 11. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(E), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(C)(3), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150. 
 13. Sloane, supra note 10 at 49. 
 14. Id. at 53. 
 15. Kathryn A. Dittrick Heebner, Protecting the Truly Persecuted: Restructuring the Flawed 
Asylum System, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 549, 552 (2005). 
 16. 402 U.S. 49 (1971). 
 17. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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to rely on length of stay “and other attendant circumstances” to 
determine whether resettlement had occurred.18 The aliens in Chinese 
American were found to be firmly resettled in Hong Kong because their 
asylum applications were filed about twenty years after their original 
flight from communist China.19 The court made no inquiry “whether the 
government of Hong Kong had extended to the aliens an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement.”20
Similarly, in Farbakhsh v. INS, the Eighth Circuit denied asylum to 
an Iranian alien based on a variety of circumstantial factors.21 The alien 
was found firmly resettled in Spain based on the fact that he lived there 
more than four years without fear, intended to remain in Spain, and had 
two younger siblings who lived there.22 The court made “no explicit 
mention of the formal issuance of an offer of permanent 
resettlement . . . .”23
 
2.  Regulatory and statutory changes 
 
On October 1, 1990, federal regulations made resettlement in another 
country a mandatory basis for denying asylum.24 The text directed that 
“[a]n immigration judge or asylum officer shall not grant asylum to any 
applicant who . . . [h]as been firmly resettled” before arriving in the 
United States.25 Firm resettlement is defined as “enter[ing] into another 
country with, or while in that country receiv[ing], an offer of permanent 
resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement . . . .”26
An alien found to be firmly resettled can overcome the bar to asylum 
through one of two exceptions: First, an alien can show “[t]hat his or her 
entry into that [third] country was a necessary consequence of his or her 
flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only as 
long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did 
not establish significant ties in that country.”27 Second, an alien can show 
 18. See Chinese Am. Civic Counsel v. Att’y Gen., 566 F.2d 321, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 19. Id. at 326. 
 20. Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 485 (3d Cir. 2001) (criticizing the analysis used in 
Chinese American). 
 21. 20 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 22. Abdille, 242 F.3d at 485. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2006). 
 25. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B). 
 26. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 27. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a). 
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“[t]hat the conditions of his or her residence in that country were so 
substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of 
refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled.”28 The Code of Federal 
Regulations provides a list of factors to consider in determining if a 
refugee’s residence has been strictly restricted including type of housing, 
employment, country conditions, and right of entry.29
The new regulations deemphasized the question of whether a refugee 
remains in flight, and instead focused the inquiry of firm resettlement on 
whether there was an actual offer of permanent resettlement.30 The 
government bears the initial burden of showing that the firm resettlement 
bar applies, and then the burden shifts to the alien to show that he or she 
was not firmly resettled.31 Ultimately, the firm resettlement bar was 
codified as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996.32
 
B.  Circuit Court Split 
 
Although firm resettlement became a bar to asylum in 1990, the U.S. 
Circuit Courts remain split on what type of showing supports the finding 
of “firm resettlement” and how to interpret § 208.15 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations.33 Some circuits find firm resettlement only where 
there is direct evidence of a concrete offer of permanent residency from 
another country,34 using other factors only “if they rise to a sufficient 
level of clarity and force[.]”35 Other circuits take a broader view and 
argue that firm resettlement can be proved by a totality of circumstances 
including length of stay in country, receipt of benefits, family ties, 
property connections, and offer of permanent resident status (which is 
extremely important).36
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Sloane, supra note 10 at 57. 
 31. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 32. 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (West 2007).
 33. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 973. 
 34. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no firm resettlement 
because no formal offer of residency was given); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(using formal offer approach and finding no firm resettlement in Senegal based solely on a lengthy 
stay); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that government documents 
approving asylum application—without a formal offer—were not sufficient evidence to establish 
firm resettlement). 
 35. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 973–74. 
 36. See, e.g., Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding firm resettlement based on 
alien’s plentiful opportunities and comfortable circumstances in Germany even when no offer of 
permanent residency existed); Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006) (directing lower court 
to consider non-offer based factors in evaluating firm resettlement). 
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In spite of the differing approaches, the circuits generally agree on 
several points: first, “the government bears the initial burden of showing 
an offer of [firm resettlement] . . . such that the firm resettlement bar 
applies and the burden shifts to the alien to rebut it;”37 second, “the 
threshold showing of an offer can be made by direct,  or indirect, 
evidence” (circuits differ on the weight each is given);38 and third, the 
government’s direct evidence may include “a grant of asylum, a 
residence permit, and travel documents.”39
 
1.  Offer approach 
 
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have adopted an offer-based 
test for determining firm resettlement.40 These Circuits focus on the plain 
language of 8 C.F.R. § 208.15—the existence vel non of “an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement . . . .”41 Under this approach, non-offer-based evidence may 
only be used if it is of sufficient force “to infer that the third country 
officially sanctions the alien’s indefinite presence” and if “direct 
evidence of a formal offer is unobtainable . . . .”42 The type of direct 
evidence that may support a finding of firm resettlement includes a grant 
of asylum, a residence permit, and travel documents.43
Abdille v. Ashcroft44 has been dubbed “the leading case that takes an 
offer-based approach.”45 Where an alien fled Somalia and stayed in 
South Africa for two years before coming to the United States, the court 
in Abdille had insufficient evidence of an offer to decide if the alien had 
firmly resettled.46 The court used the language and structure of 8 C.F.R. 
§208.15 as a guide, stating that the “firm resettlement analysis [centers] 
on the question whether a third country issued to the alien an offer of 
some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country 
 37. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 972. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no firm resettlement 
because no formal offer of residency was given); Diallo v. Ashcroft. 381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(using formal offer approach and finding no firm resettlement in Senegal based solely on a lengthy 
stay); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that government documents 
approving asylum application—without a formal offer—were not sufficient evidence to establish 
firm resettlement). 
 41. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2006). 
 42. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 976. 
 43. Id. at 972. 
 44. 242 F.3d 477 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
 45. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 973. 
 46. Schell, supra note 6, at 256. 
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on a permanent basis.”47 Even though the court had government 
documents that approved Abdille’s asylum application in South Africa, 
his refugee status expired after two years, at which time he would be 
subject to prosecution without further action on his part.48 Even though 
Abdille’s asylum in South Africa seemed temporary, the case was 
remanded to determine whether an offer existed.49
Other subsequent cases have also employed the offer-based 
approach. In Diallo v. Ashcroft, the court asserted that “[t]he primary and 
initial consideration [in determining firm resettlement], therefore, is a 
simple one—whether or not the intermediary country has made some sort 
of offer of permanent resettlement.”50 The Seventh Circuit emphasized 
that other circumstantial factors come into play only “when the applicant 
seeks to demonstrate that she falls into one of the two exceptions.”51 The 
focus remained the same in the Ninth Circuit case of Ali v. Ashcroft 
where an  alien who was not offered permanent residency was not firmly 
resettled within the meaning of the statute.52 It was irrelevant that the 
alien lived and worked in Ethiopia for five years before applying for 
asylum in the United States. 
 
2.  Totality of circumstances approach 
 
The Second and Fourth Circuits are among those that follow a more 
broad approach for determining firm resettlement, focusing on the 
totality of the alien’s circumstances.53 In general, this approach 
developed from decisions under the pre-1990 regime.54
In Sall v. Gonzales, the court found that four years of residency in 
Senegal was insufficient evidence that the alien had firmly resettled in 
Senegal after being forced to leave Mauritania.55 The Second Circuit 
directed the lower court to consider on remand 
 
whether Sall intended to settle in Senegal when he arrived there, 
whether he had family ties there, whether he had business or property 
 47. Abdille, 242 F.3d at 485. 
 48. Id. at 488. 
 49. Id. at 489–90. 
 50. 381 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 394 F.3d 780, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 53. See, e.g., Mussie v. U.S. I.N.S., 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2006); Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 
229 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 54. See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing the totality of 
circumstances approach). 
 55. Sall, 437 F.3d at 229. 
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connections that connote permanence, and whether he enjoyed the legal 
rights—such as the right to work and to enter and leave the country at 
will—that permanently settled persons can expect to have.56
 
The Sall Court gave two reasons for preferring the broader conception of 
firm resettlement: First, foreign statutes differ from U.S. immigration 
provisions and may not be comparable. Second, it is important to 
preserve asylum for the truly desperate refugees.57
Factors such as length of stay in the country, educational 
opportunities, government assistance, employment, and travel documents 
were considered more relevant to the firm resettlement inquiry than a 
formal offer in Mussie v. INS58 In Mussie, the court held that asylum was 
rightly denied because the alien applied for and received asylum in 
Germany. This award of asylum constituted sufficient evidence of an 
offer of some type of permanent resettlement even though the record did 
not indicate whether she ever attained permanent resident status. 
 
III.  FIRM RESETTLEMENT EXPLORED IN MAHARAJ V. GONZALES 
 
A.  Facts of the Case 
 
The Maharaj family—an Indo-Fijian family of four (husband, wife, 
and two children)—lived in Fiji until November 1987, when their local 
government was overthrown.59 Up to that time, Mr. Maharaj worked as a 
bus driver and helped transport voters to polling stations during Fiji’s 
national elections.60 Maharaj’s bus displayed propaganda for the winning 
party (which was subsequently overthrown). This display led to acts of 
violence directed at the Maharaj family.61 Among other things, the 
husband was tied up and received death threats, the wife was publicly 
humiliated and raped at gunpoint, the family’s residence was burned 
down, they were restricted in practicing Hinduism, and they were denied 
service by the police and the hospital.62 This severe persecution made it 
necessary for them to leave their native country.63
To seek refuge, the Maharaj family fled to Canada, where the 
 56. Id. at 235. 
 57. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 974. 
 58. 172 F.3d at 329. 
 59. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 964–65. 
 60. Id. at 964. 
 61. Id. at 965. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 964–65. 
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husband’s sister lived.64 They settled in Edmonton and applied for 
asylum in Canada.65 The family lived in Canada nearly four years, during 
which time they had a child, sent their children to public schools, 
received free health care, were granted work authorization, enjoyed 
employment, and worshipped freely at a Hindu Temple.66
In March 1991, the family entered the United States because they 
were dissatisfied with their employment opportunities and wanted to 
improve their economic situation.67 Although the Maharajs had begun 
the process of applying for refugee status in Canada, they left before 
authorities reviewed their case or offered permanent residency.68 The 
Maharaj family entered the United States as visitors but overstayed their 
six-month allowance, which made them deportable.69
The Maharajs then requested asylum in the United States,70 but the 
immigration judge assigned to their case declared them ineligible, 
applying a rebuttable presumption of firm resettlement.71 The Board of 
Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit denied 
petition for review.72
During a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted Maharaj’s 
petition for asylum.73 The court concluded there was not enough 
evidence to show that Maharaj was “firmly resettled” in Canada, and 
therefore, he was not barred from seeking asylum in the United States 
within the meaning of the law.74 The case was remanded to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals for a reevaluation of whether Maharaj’s rights in 
Canada amounted to “an offer of permanent residence, citizenship, or 
some other type of permanent resettlement” and whether Maharaj still 
faced a risk of returning to Fiji.75
 
 
 
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 963, 979. 
 67. Id. at 965. Sunita Maharaj testified that the family “wanted to . . . have more money and 
build ourself [sic]. So, that’s the time when we thought we don’t [sic] like Canada.” Id. 
 68. Id. at 979. 
 69. Id. at 965. 
 70. Id. at 966. 
 71. Id. at 963. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 978. 
 75. Id. 
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B.  Ninth Circuit Reasoning 
 
The court in Maharaj used the formal offer approach to resettlement 
and concluded that firm resettlement is not just about the length of stay 
in a country.76 In coming to this conclusion, the court analyzed prior 
Ninth Circuit cases that addressed the issue of the mandatory bar to 
asylum, focusing specifically on the decisions in Cheo v. INS,77 
Camposeco-Montejo v. Ashcroft,78 and Ali v. Ashcroft.79
In Cheo, Cambodian nationals who lived for three years undisturbed 
in Malaysia were found to be firmly resettled and ineligible for asylum in 
the United States.80 The court held that “a duration of residence in a third 
country sufficient to support an inference of permanent resettlement . . . 
shifts the burden of proving absence of firm resettlement to the 
applicant.”81 Because the Cambodians in Cheo did not offer any contrary 
evidence, their lengthy and safe stay in Malaysia was sufficient to bar an 
asylum claim.82
The Cheo holding was clarified six years later in Camposeco-
Montejo, where a Guatemalan citizen fled to Mexico before seeking 
refuge in the United States.83 Although he lived in Mexico for sixteen 
years, the young man was not found firmly resettled because his freedom 
was severely restricted while in that intermediate country.84 He was not 
allowed to leave a single municipality, could not attend Mexican schools, 
and was threatened with repatriation.85 Thus, a lengthy stay in a third 
country does not necessarily qualify as firm resettlement if the person 
does not enjoy expected freedoms of a permanent resident.86
The Ninth Circuit’s most recent decision in Ali provided further 
clarification when the court concluded that firm resettlement requires an 
actual offer of permanent resident status, not just an offer of temporary 
residency.87 The Ali Family, although permitted to stay in Ethiopia, 
could not work or go to school. The Court distinguished Ali (where 
Somalians resided five years in Ethiopia) from Cheo (where Cambodians 
 76. Id. at 975. 
 77. 162 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 78. 384 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 79. 394 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 80. Cheo, 162 F.3d at 1227. 
 81. Id. at 1229. 
 82. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 83. Id. at 970. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 971. 
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resided three years in Malaysia) because in the former case there was 
evidence that no offer had been received, and in the latter situation there 
was no evidence.88
Although many courts rely on some type of Cheo analysis when 
examining firm resettlement, the Ninth Circuit in Maharaj chose not to 
apply a presumption of firm resettlement simply because Maharaj had 
lived in Canada for a long time. Unlike Cheo where there was no 
evidence about the alien’s legal status, in Maharaj, there was evidence, 
but no information about what Maharaj’s work permit and pending 
application meant.89 They were not willing to assume that “living, 
working, and applying for some type of refugee or asylum status 
amounts to a formal offer of resettlement . . . .”90
In deciding this case, the Ninth Circuit pointed to other circuits that 
have addressed the issue of firm resettlement. The court rejected the 
“totality of circumstances” approach and aligned itself with the Third and 
Seventh Circuits in favoring the offer-based approach, which requires the 
existence vel non of “an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, 
or some other type of permanent resettlement.” 91 The court justified its 
adoption of the offer-based approach using several textual arguments. 
First, the Court looked at the semantic structure of the statute 
regarding firm resettlement and noted the sequence for the firm 
resettlement inquiry: first, you ask if there is an offer.92 “An alien is 
considered to be firmly resettled if . . . [the alien] received an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement.”93 Only after an offer is found is it appropriate to move to 
the two exceptions under (a) and (b)—where residence in a third country 
was only a necessary part of flight or where the person’s rights were 
severely restricted.94 And only when the exceptions come into play 
should a court “consider factors such as the length of time spent in the 
country, housing, and the type and extent of the refugee’s 
employment.”95 There is no language in the statute about preserving 
asylum, regardless of whether a formal offer of resettlement in another 
country was received.96 If there is no offer, then the two exceptions do 
not even apply. Circumstances are not part of the preliminary inquiry 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 973. 
 92. Id. at 975. 
 93. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 94. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 975. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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about an offer unless direct evidence is unavailable. Even then, the 
evidence must be of sufficient force to show that “the third country 
officially sanctions the alien’s indefinite presence.”97
Second, the court highlighted the statutory language and asserted that 
firm resettlement is coextensive with receipt of an offer of permanent 
resettlement.98 The statute requires “an offer of” one of three things: 
“permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement.”99 The court rejected the idea that an alien could have an 
offer of permanent residence or some other type of permanent 
resettlement. It pointed out the absurdity that if permanent residence 
could be obtained “without an offer through long-term residence, 
employment, [etc.], an alien could never obtain ‘some other type of 
permanent resettlement . . . .’”100
Finally, the court expressed its concern that firm resettlement be 
broadened beyond its plain focus.101 It points out that § 208.15 was 
adopted at the same time that firm resettlement became a bar to asylum, 
implying that what might bar someone from gaining asylum should be 
construed narrowly.102 Thus, the court interpreted § 208.15 narrowly to 
reaffirm that the government bears the initial burden of proving a formal 
offer of firm resettlement by direct evidence; surrogate evidence may 
suffice only if it is of sufficient force.103
The Maharaj decision was based on two main premises: 1) there was 
insufficient evidence that Maharaj received and rejected an offer of 
permanent resettlement, and 2) the possibility of an offer is not the same 
thing as an offer.104 The mere fact that Maharaj worked and lived in 
Canada was not an offer, and not to be considered unless the asylum 
seeker was trying to prove they fit within one of the exceptions or direct 
evidence was unavailable.105 Justice Rymer noted that one can be 
allowed to work and receive benefits without having an offer of 
resettlement, but the record was undeveloped.106 In the end, it did not 
matter that Canada had a superb asylum program similar to the United 
States;107 the court wanted direct evidence that Maharaj received an offer 
 97. Id. at 976. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 100. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 975. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 975–76. 
 104. Id. at 977. 
 105. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 106. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 978. 
 107. Id. at 979. 
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of resettlement from Canada, which was not possible because Maharaj 
left the country before it was offered to him.108
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The Nature of Asylum Appeals to Aliens 
 
Asylum is unique from other forms of immigration and has been 
described as “one of the easiest ways for unqualified aliens to achieve 
legal status in the United States under the guise of protection from 
persecution.”109 Whereas most immigrants to the United States have to 
wait for extended periods of time to just acquire a visa and then meet 
other time requirements to achieve legal permanent resident status, 
asylum seekers can come to the United States illegally, become a legal 
permanent resident within one year, and eventually be granted 
citizenship. Aliens may apply for asylum proactively within one year of 
their arrival in the United States, or they may apply for asylum 
defensively to prevent their removal by the U.S. government.110
Asylum is an appealing option to aliens for two main reasons. First, 
there is a low burden of proof. A refugee must have a “well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion[.]”111 But, when it comes to 
proving this fear of persecution, an alien’s own testimony can be 
sufficient.112 Second, aliens can apply for asylum “irrespective of such 
alien’s [illegal] status” in the United States.113 Thus, asylum is the only 
option that allows them to remain in the United States without hiding 
from authorities. 
In spite of the ease with which asylum can be acquired, asylum can 
also be denied on statutory grounds or as a matter of discretion.114 The 
six mandatory bars to asylum suggest that certain classes of aliens are 
undesirable to have in the United States. In addition to keeping out aliens 
who (1) have firmly resettled in a third country, the law does not grant 
asylum to aliens who (2) persecute any person because of their race, 
religion, nationality, or opinion, (3) have a criminal conviction, (4) 
commit a serious nonpolitical crime, (5) pose a possible danger to U.S. 
 108. Id. at 977. 
 109. Heebner, supra note 15 at 566. 
 110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000). 
 111. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2000). 
 112. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2007). 
 113. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). 
 114. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:10 (2d ed. 2003). 
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security, or (6) are involved in terrorist activities/organizations.115 With 
the exception of firm resettlement, all the bars to asylum relate to crimes 
or national security. Although firm resettlement “does not reflect a 
societal judgment about the moral fitness of an asylum applicant’s 
character[,]”116 it seems likely that firm resettlement is included with the 
other bars because it rises to the same level of importance. Otherwise, 
firm resettlement could have continued to function as a factor instead of 
being applied as a bar to asylum. 
 
B.  Protection of the U.S. Immigration System Justifies a Test for Firm 
Resettlement That Includes Non-Offer Based Factors 
 
Even though the number of refugees and asylees admitted to the 
United States has decreased in recent years,117 a comparison of most 
asylum seekers’ original countries with the wait lengths for immigrant 
visas in those countries suggests that asylum may be used as a backdoor 
way to get legalized presence in the United States. This note does not 
purport that Maharaj applied for asylum in the United States merely as a 
way to circumvent immigration laws. However, potential abuse of U.S. 
asylum law is all the more reason for courts to adopt a test for firm 
resettlement that considers the totality of an alien’s circumstances in 
addition to looking for an offer. 
A research analyst from Georgetown University has noted the 
possible “link between visa policy and refugee and asylum issues.”118 
Supporting this proposition is the fact that the United States has 
implemented “stricter visa regulations on citizens of countries that 
produce large numbers of asylum seekers.”119  But as a court in the 
United Kingdom suggested, “[w]hy require visas from certain countries 
(and in particular those from which most bogus asylum seekers are found 
to come) unless visa nationals can be prevented from reaching our 
shores? [An alien’s] very arrival here [at a port of entry] otherwise 
entitles them to apply for asylum and thus defeats the visa regime.”120
Recent data suggests that asylum may be used as a backdoor way to 
get legalized presence in the United States. Numbers shows that the 
 115. 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(2)(A). 
 116. Sloane, supra note 10 at 47. 
 117. In 2004, 27,169 persons were granted asylum; in 2005, 25,257 persons were granted 
asylum. ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 118. Bryan Paul Christian, Visa Policy, Inspection and Exit Controls: Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Migration Management, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 223 (1999). 
 119. Jennifer Hyndman & James McLean, Settling Like a State: Acehnese Refugees in 
Vancouver, 19 J. REFUGEE STUD. 345, 348 (2006). 
 120. Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 217 (2005). 
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“leading countries of origin for persons granted asylum are China (21 
percent), Columbia (13 percent), [and] Haiti (12 percent).”121 
Interestingly, China is one of only five categories for the issuance of 
immigrant visas. (The government has created categories—based on 
demand and region—for the allotment of visas).122 According to the 
United States Visa Bulletin for January 2007, in China’s category, the 
wait for a family-based visa is backed up as far as June 22, 1995 (11.5 
years), and the earliest priority date for processing is March 15, 2002.123 
For all other countries (which would include Haiti and Columbia), the 
wait for a family-based visa is backed up as far as January 8, 1996 (11 
years) with an earliest priority date for processing of March 15, 2002.124 
While some claim that asylum is “a far more difficult way of entering or 
remaining in the United States than other forms of relief available to 
immigrants,”125 it appears that a person who desires to come to the 
United States might speed up their immigration process by applying for 
asylum instead of a visa. 
For example, a Chinese national who meets the necessary standard of 
proof can be granted asylum almost immediately whereas that same 
person (if applying from China) would have to wait at least four years to 
receive a family-based visa—and that is assuming they have a family 
member living in the United States that is a U.S. citizen. 
A standard for firm resettlement that looks at circumstances in 
addition to looking for a vel non offer will help ensure that persecuted 
persons who have opportunities to settle and find protection in third-
party countries do not use U.S. asylum as a convenient way to get legal 
presence in the United States. Admittedly, the discretion that would 
accompany an evaluation of non-offer based factors creates an additional 
hurdle for those seeking asylum. Some have even said that the definition 
or application of firm resettlement has become “not a bar to asylum for 
otherwise qualified refugees, but an additional criterion for refugee 
status.”126 But that additional hurdle may prevent applicants from using 
asylum as a shortcut to citizenship. 
 
 121. ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 122. These categories are China, India, Mexico, Philippines, and All others. See U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin for Jan. 2007, No. 101, Vol. VIII, VISA BULLETIN 
(2007), http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_3100.html#.
 123. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin for Jan. 2007, No. 101, 
Vol. VIII, VISA BULLETIN (2007), http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_3100.html#.
 124. Id. 
 125. Peter Schey, U.S. Immigration Policies and the War on Terrorism, 19 L.A. LAWYER 12 
(Sept. 2006). 
 126. Sloane, supra note 10 at 48. 
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C.  Firm Resettlement Interpretations 
 
Before 1996, the court generally disqualified aliens from seeking 
asylum if they had resettled in another country prior to arriving in the 
United States;127 however in a large percentage of cases heard after 1996, 
when an alien seeking asylum had resettled in another country before 
arriving in the United States, courts have been slow to disqualify aliens, 
and only do so if there is a firm offer (regardless of the alien’s 
circumstances in the intermediate country).128
Some commentators have claimed that there is no binding precedent 
or elaborative authority on what constitutes firm resettlement,129 yet one 
Supreme Court case does discuss firm resettlement.130 In Yee Chien Woo, 
the court identified the term “firmly resettled” as being closely related to 
the central theme of refugee legislation—creating a haven for the world’s 
homeless.131 Although the opinion was written before the 1990 
regulations were passed, its guidance should not be ignored because it 
remains the only Supreme Court case to discuss firm resettlement and the 
opinion has not been overturned. Speaking about the Fair Share Refugee 
Act, the court noted that Congress 
 
never intended to open the United States to refugees who had found 
shelter in another nation and had begun to build new lives. Nor could 
Congress have intended to make refugees in flight from persecution 
compete with all of the world’s resettled refugees . . . Such an 
interpretation would subvert the lofty goals embodied in the whole 
pattern of our refugee legislation.132
 
The determination of firm resettlement should include an evaluation 
not only of whether there was an offer, but also an evaluation of how 
long an alien waited to apply after originally fleeing persecution, and 
what intent an alien had to permanently stay in a third country. In Yee 
 127. See, e.g., Assfaw v. INS, 48 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir. 1995); Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397 
(10th Cir. 1994); Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 1994); Barou-Barukoff v. INS, 983 F.2d 
1075 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 128. See, e.g., Sultani v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2006); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 
780 (9th Cir. 2005); Mushka v. INS, 149 Fed. Appx. 28 (2d Cir. 2005); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
687 (7th Cir. 2004); Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 78 Fed. Appx. 264 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 129. Matthew J. Fery, Note, Determining Better Standards for Firm Resettlement, Judicial 
Discretion, and Immigration Administrative Practice: Diallo v. Aschcroft, 381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 
2004), 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 505, 511–12 (2006). 
 130. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971); See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 
961, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 131. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. at 55. 
 132. Id. at 56. 
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Chien Woo—the only Supreme Court case to discuss firm resettlement—
the court emphasized that an alien’s presence in the United States must 
be proximate to their original flight.133 If a main purpose of asylum is to 
help the persecuted find a safe haven, there is seldom a reason to grant 
asylum to a person like Maharaj, who has found safety or refuge in 
another country. “A lengthy, peaceful stay creates a presumption of firm 
resettlement.”134
The Ninth Circuit analysis used in Maharaj v. Gonzales makes it 
easier for refugees to enter the United States and could lead to country 
shopping if aliens know they can come to the United States as an asylee 
and receive government benefits, so long as they received no offer of 
residency in another country. The Maharaj family had begun the process 
of acquiring asylum in Canada and chose not to wait until their file was 
processed and a final decision made.135 They preferred to come to the 
United States because Canada did not offer the job opportunities they 
wanted. 
 
D.  The Purpose of Asylum Law Does Not Cover Country Shopping 
 
Throughout the Maharaj case, the court claims to hold to the “plain 
language” of the statute.136 At the same time, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledges that the statutory language is vague—it does not define 
“offer” or “other type of permanent resettlement.”137 Because of this 
ambiguity, the court relies on a legal dictionary definition for offer and 
decided to let the latter definition evolve on a case by case basis.138 In 
giving priority to the text, the court rejected the policy argument about 
country shopping, even though it acknowledged the dissent’s concern 
that the Maharaj analysis “will open the door to rampant country 
shopping, a result that our immigration laws have long sought to 
avoid.”139
Country shopping, which can essentially be defined as “hunt[ing] 
through [the] market [of different countries’ asylum programs] in search 
of the best buy,”140 undermines the purpose of asylum and may create an 
 133. Id. at 57. 
 134. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:10 (2d Ed. 2003). 
 135. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 977 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 136. Id. at 976. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 988. 
 140. MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, Shopping, (2007), http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/Shopping. See also Susan F. Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in 
Practice: Successes, Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 606 (2000). 
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undue burden on the U.S. economy. Even though some evidence shows 
that “immigrants use fewer public benefits than they pay in taxes,”141 the 
argument is often made that “illegal immigrants significantly drain both 
state and national economies.”142 In fact, some states spend tens of 
millions of dollars to educate undocumented immigrant children.143 
Additionally, “the annual cost of providing undocumented immigrants 
with medical care is $1.45 billion” according to government officials.144 
A 1992 study showed that high payments under certain welfare programs 
is “a significant predictor of immigrant settlement patterns.”145 If 
monetary payments and benefits like food stamps, public schooling, and 
hospital care “are superior to those of the emigration state, they are an 
incentive to immigration no matter which state the immigrant settles 
in.”146
Commentators involved with international migration to the United 
States have suggested two goals that any asylum system should 
accomplish.147 First, asylum should protect the persecuted or seriously 
endangered.148 Second, asylum should deter abuse of the privileges and 
resources afforded to U.S. residents.149 The broad conception of the firm 
resettlement bar helps to protect the truly desperate and to exclude from 
asylum’s protection those that have been offered protection elsewhere.150
As noted by the dissent, the Maharaj decision ignores the history and 
purpose of having a firm resettlement bar in the first place.151 Persons 
who have the rights and protections that citizenship affords do not need 
protection in another country.152 Furthermore, most advanced Western 
nations limit asylum seekers in choosing their country of asylum 
application by “adopt[ing] the principle in their asylum laws that the first 
 141. Karen M. Longacher, Losing the Forest for the Trees: How Current Immigration 
Proposals Overlook Crucial Issues, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 429, 443 (1997). 
 142. Cindy Chang, Health Care for Undocumented Immigrant Children: Special Members of 
an Underclass, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1271, 1284 (2005). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1271–72. 
 145. F. H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 81, 89 (1996). 
 146. Id. But see Karen M. Longacher, Losing the Forest for the Trees: How Current 
Immigration Proposals Overlook Crucial Issues, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 429, 446 (1997) 
(hesitating to recognize “a strong correlation between the right to free public benefits and a 
corresponding incentive to immigrate” without further evidence). 
 147. Martin & Schoenholtz, supra note 140 at 589. 
 148. Id.. 
 149. Id.. 
 150. See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (reciting reasons why some 
courts have followed the totality of circumstances approach to find firm resettlement). 
 151. Id. at 980. 
 152. Sloane, supra note 10 at 49. 
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safe haven country to which a refugee flees should be the one in which 
he or she seeks asylum.”153
Looking at how laws have evolved after Maharaj gives insight to the 
purpose for the firm resettlement bar. As of December 2004, aliens can 
only apply for asylum in either Canada or the United States, but not both 
countries.154 This directive, which was part of an agreement between the 
two countries, recognized that both Canada and the United States have 
good systems for protecting refugees, and provided that “aliens arriving 
in the United States from Canada at a land border port-of-entry shall be 
returned to Canada to seek protection under Canadian immigration 
law.”155 Under current law, Maharaj would not have been allowed to 
seek asylum in the United States after having applied for asylum in 
Canada. But such behavior, which was permitted under the offer-based 
test adopted by the Ninth Circuit, may still persist when the intermediate 
country is one other than Canada. Thus, it would be helpful in carrying 
out the purpose of asylum to look at factors besides just an offer; 
otherwise, asylum seekers could apply for asylum in other countries and 
electively choose to leave—looking for greener pastures. 
 
E.  Proposition for a New Standard 
 
Some scholars claim that an evaluation of a refugee’s circumstances 
“modif[ies] and marginalize[s]” the paramount question of firm 
resettlement.156 However, a test for firm resettlement that looks only for a 
formal offer and does not take into account an alien’s intent, length of 
stay in an intervening country, and proximity of application to flight 
overlooks the purpose of the firm resettlement bar. It is also problematic 
because many countries have immigration systems that do not mirror that 
used in the United States. 
Opponents of the totality of circumstances test have expressed the 
concern that such a test wastes judicial resources, puts an undue burden 
on the applicant, and gives judges too much leeway—leading to 
inconsistent results.157 While too much discretion for judges could lead to 
inconsistent results, too little discretion makes it easy for the asylum 
system to be abused. Admittedly, a totality of circumstances test would 
require more effort in gathering circumstantial evidence. Even so, such a 
 153. Martin & Schoenholtz, supra note 140 at 606. 
 154. See Agreement for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from 
Nationals of Third Countries, U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, http://www.state.gov/s/l/38616.htm. 
 155. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 977 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 156. Sloane, supra note 10 at 60. 
 157. Id. at 63–64. 
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process of fact-finding is necessarily part of an offer-based test as well. 
The role of judges is to evaluate the facts of individual cases (which are 
never the same). It would make little difference in the overall burden on 
judges if, in addition to looking for an offer of resettlement, judges were 
guided to consider other specific circumstances or factors. This would 
lead to more consistent results in asylum law than would simply letting 
the definition of firm resettlement evolve over time, which is what the 
majority in Maharaj suggested doing.158
A possible reason why many courts are turning to an offer-based test 
for determining resettlement is that it simplifies the question of firm 
resettlement. Judges want “helpful and comprehensive standards that 
[they] can use in their consideration of whether a petition for asylum can 
be granted or not.”159 However, a strictly offer-based evaluation is not 
necessarily comprehensive. In some cases, such as Maharaj’s, looking 
only at concrete offers of residency neglects evidence that might 
otherwise bar an asylum seeker. It seems unlikely that Congress would 
knowingly admit to the United States as a legal permanent resident one 
who had lived in another country safely and peacefully for four years, 
received benefits in a third country, but “want[s] to see what the United 
States looks like,” “likes this place much better than Canada,” or desires 
to “have more money and build [themselves].”160
To be true to the statutory text and still honor the purpose of asylum, 
courts should adopt the totality of circumstances approach for 
determining resettlement with the change that a formal offer be the first 
factor considered and given most weight. In this way, courts are to look 
first for an offer but must also consider circumstances. The existence or 
absence of a formal offer should not be dispositive but should merely be 
the starting point to determining if the alien is deserving of asylum 
protection. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although more than fifteen years have passed since firm resettlement 
became a bar to asylum, circuit courts are still split on how to determine 
whether firm resettlement has occurred. While the Ninth Circuit in 
Maharaj v. Gonzales joined others in adopting an offer-based approach 
to firm resettlement, such a narrow test may allow aliens to enter the 
United States who do not need protection but rather want a shortcut to 
citizenship. Asylum is a unique area of immigration law that can be 
 158. Maharaj , 450 F.3d at 976. 
 159. Fery, supra note 129, at 506. 
 160. Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 979. 
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subject to abuse. To protect the purposes of asylum and deter country 
shopping, courts need a clear and comprehensive standard for 
determining resettlement that looks not only for a vel non offer but also 
considers factors such as proximity to flight, intent to remain in a third 
country, and family ties. Even though this will increase the burden of 
proof for asylum applicants, it will help the United States continue to 
carry out its policy of receiving the tired and poor with no where else to 
turn. 
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